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Summary
Increasingly demanding helicopter operations lead to a higher workload on the pilot. To support
these helicopter operations and relief the workload on the pilot more sophisticated avionics are
incorporated. Many of the avionics' functional requirements are realised in software. This has
induced a strong growth of the size and complexity of the used software.
Often this software contains safety critical components as well as less critical components.
Because of economic pressure, techniques are needed to reduce the development effort of the
less critical software components in these systems without compromising the functioning of the
critical components and thus the airworthiness. One solution - as proposed by DO-178B:
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification - is partitioning. A
partitioning architecture is discussed which is successfully implemented and certified as a part
of helicopter avionics. DO-178B categorises software components into five criticality levels.
The realised avionics contains software components of three different levels including the most
critical level (i.e. level A).
The developed novel partitioning architecture is based on two hardware capabilities, a Memory
Management Unit (MMU) and a processor with two protection levels. The hardware of the
developed system contains a compliant processor with built-in MMU that supports both
segmentation as well as paging as means of memory protection. Only paging is used because
with the selected processor segmentation induces up to 50% performance overhead whereas the
overhead of paging stays well below 5%.
Central to the partitioning architecture is a proprietary kernel that runs in a protected
environment. The proprietary kernel manages all protections within the application. Like most
operating systems, protection is provided between tasks. Furthermore protection is provided
between components of different software levels (i.e. intra task and inter task) which is the most
important protection support concerning safety.
A formal model of avionics partitioning defines three essential requirements for the kernel's
access mediation functions, i.e. complete, tamper-proof and assured. All these essential
attributes are met by the developed partitioning architecture. The developed partitioning
architecture can be ported to other hardware and extended, with for example: support for
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) and support for distributed and multi-processor systems.
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The implemented partitioning architecture was successfully certified as a part of the helicopter
avionics. Evaluation of the partioning architecture implementation indicated a very favorable
benefit to a reasonable cost. The measured processor load overhead induced by partitioning is
only about 1%. Memory usage increased by approximately 5%. These resource requirements are
very acceptable considering the economic advantages gained. Consequently the developed
partitioning architecture is very useful and can be reused in future applications.
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Abbreviations
ACR Avionics Computer Resource
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMA Integrated Modular Avionics
MMU Memory Management Unit
SP/DP Single Pilot/Dual Pilot
VFR Visual Flight Rules
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1 Introduction
In the early 1980s, a new era for airborne systems and equipment began. Usage of software
incorporated in these systems started to increase with a dazzling speed. The amount of software
used in civil aircraft has almost been doubled every two years and given this trend it is expected
to grow with a factor of about 1000 over the next 20 years [Sto96]. An industry accepted
guidance - DO-178 that is currently in revision B [RTC92] - was written. This guideline has the
purpose: ``to provide guidelines for the production of software for airborne systems and
equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies
with airworthiness requirements''.
In correspondence with FAR/JAR-25 [FAR] DO-178B [RTC92] identifies five levels of system
failure conditions and associates herewith five software safety levels (hereafter simply referred
to as levels). See Table 1 for the categorisation of the software safety levels.
Table 1
 Software Safety Level  Failure impact
 Level A  Catastrophic
Level B  Hazardous
 Level C  Major
 Level D  Minor
 Level E  No Effect
The highest level software - Level A - is considered to have possible catastrophic impact if the
software fails to operate according to its requirements. The lowest level - Level E - is
considered to have no impact on flight safety. The identification of multiple software levels
within one application imposes the problem that components of different levels may interfere
with each other. This problem can be overcome by developing all components according to the
highest identified level. However, as easy as this solution may seem as costly can the realisation
thereof become. DO-178B [RTC92] proposes several architectural concepts to tackle this
problem. One of these concepts is partitioning.
Partitioning is described by DO-178B [RTC92] as: “Partitioning is a technique for providing
isolation between functionally independent software components to contain and/or isolate faults
and potentially reduce the effort of the software verification process”.
The realisation of a safety critical helicopter avionics application initiated the development of a
proprietary partitioning architecture that conforms to the DO-178B [RTC92] guideline. A
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partitioning architecture was developed whose only hardware requirements are a processor with
protection modes and a memory management unit (MMU). This partitioning architecture is
presented in section 2, the realisation in the avionics application is discussed in section 3.
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2 A partitioning architecture for safety-critical airborne software
When using multiple levels of software - as defined by DO-178B [RTC92] - within a single
hardware environment care has to be taken to prevent lower level components from influencing
higher level components of the software. Faced with such a situation for a real application two
options were considered:
1. To develop all software components according to the highest identified level (i.e. level A)
even if a lower level would be sufficient for some components. This option was considered
because the size of the components of another level than level A was relatively small.
2. To develop a partitioning scheme. Since the software is running on a processor with built-in
MMU and protection mechanism (i.e. i386EX [Int87]) it is possible to implement a
partitioning scheme without adding hardware requirements.
The main points of consideration were effort, flexibility and performance. Looking just at initial
effort would maybe have favoured against partitioning but recurring effort because of
modifications and extensions is very much in favour of partitioning. Flexibility is strongly
related to the effort issues. In this sense, partitioning has a great advantage over the first option.
With partitioning, it is easy to add a new extension at a lower level (e.g. new or enhanced
maintenance or debug capabilities) whereas without partitioning a lot of effort could be induced.
Performance however can be a big concern for partitioning. Experimental measurements on the
real application pointed out that partitioning could add up to 50% execution time. This would
have effectively eliminated the option to use partitioning if there were not a more efficient
solution.
This performance overhead of partitioning is caused mainly by the usage of a memory
management unit (MMU) which is needed to manage protection of memory and memory
mapped hardware resources. The used processor has two basic approaches to memory
management namely segmentation and paging (these two approaches can actually be combined
into a hybrid form). Performance measurements greatly favoured paging over segmentation.
Whereas segmentation adds up to 50% overhead, the overhead of paging stayed well below 5%.
It should be noted that all memory allocation is static and no swapping is performed.
Paging however has a fixed granularity (4Kb for the used processor) and that can become a
problem in protecting small special purpose memories (e.g. special non-volatile or dual-ported
memory). However, analysis of the memory usage of the real application - especially the usage
of the small special purpose memories - indicated no serious problems concerning the paging
granularity.
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After evaluation it was decided to develop a partitioning scheme based on paged memory
management. The performance overhead of segmentation is simply too large and the potential
effort increase without partitioning is unacceptable.
The rest of this section will outline the general concepts of the developed partitioning
architecture. The discussion focuses mainly on the protection issues of the partitioning
architecture. In addition, issues like the incorporation of tasking on top of the partitioning
architecture, reusability and extendibility are discussed.
2.1 Features and goals
Following are the main features and goals of the practical general partitioning architecture:
• Compliance to the three essential attributes for an access mediation function provided by the
kernel as defined by Di Vito [Vit98]:
Complete
There shall be no way for software running in any partition to bypass the kernel and access
resources not under the kernel's control.
Tamper-proof
There shall be no way for software in any partition to tamper with the kernel or its data so as
to subvert the kernel's control of system resources.
Assured
The kernel shall contain minimal functionality and shall meet all of the regulator's
requirements for the criticality rating of the overall Avionics Computer Resource (ACR).
• Inter level protection support (i.e. inter and intra task).
• Multi-tasking and inter task protection support.
• Minimal extra resources requirements, notably performance overhead.
• Portability to similar hardware architectures (i.e. processor with protection levels and
MMU).
• Shared memory support for inter level and inter task sharing.
• Static memory management (i.e. no swapping, no dynamic memory allocation).
Memory management is static because for dynamic memory management it is much harder to
prove correct usage with respect to availability and access time. Therefore, if it is possible to use
static memory management - thus no swapping and dynamic memory allocation - it is preferred
above dynamic memory management for safety critical applications.
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2.2 Partitioning protection architecture
The primary goal of the usage of a partitioning protection architecture in avionics is to ensure
the safety of the people in the aircraft. This goal infers that it is most appropriate to use carefully
chosen proven concepts for the partitioning architecture.
The partitioning protection architecture of this application is based on two concepts used in
most operating systems:
1. The possibility to run partitioning management software - in the form of a kernel - in a
protected environment.
2. Memory protection management through the usage of an MMU (paging).
However, the memory management of this partitioning architecture is not exactly as memory
management used in other operating systems. Whereas most operating systems employ memory
management mainly on a per task basis, memory management for this partitioning architecture
is primarily based on a per software level basis (i.e. across tasks/threads).
Figure 1 shows the structure of the partitioning architecture. Each instantiation of a partition is
assigned a level that is used to enforce access restrictions. Access to the partitions is controlled
by defining execution environments with restricted access to the partitions. Six execution
environments are defined: one for each of the possible software levels (i.e. A to E) and one for
the kernel. Figure 2 shows the possible transitions between execution environments. How
access to partitions is restricted within the six execution environments is defined as follows:
 
Task state store 
partition 
 
Task private code 
partition 
 
Stack partition 
 
Private data 
partition 
 
Inter level shared 
data partition 
Level=kernel Level=[kernel,A..E] Level=[kernel,A..E] Level=[kernel,A..E] Level=[kernel,A..E] 
1..N Task 
 
Inter task shared 
code partition 
 
Inter task shared 
data partition 
 
Inter task & level 
shared data 
partition 
Level=[kernel,A..E] Level=[kernel,A..E] Level=[kernel,A..E] 
0..6 0..1
1 
0..6 0..6 
0..6 0..6 0..6 
Figure 1 partitioning architecture
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Level A 
Kernel 
Level D Level C 
Level E Level B 
Figure 2 execution environment transitions
• Each task owns a partition to store the Task State. This partition is only readable and
writable by the kernel.
• Each task owns one to eleven stack partitions. A kernel stack must always be provided.
Furthermore, for each level of code executed by the task a stack partition must be provided.
Finally, for each level of code involved in interrupt handling a stack partition must be
assigned. Only one of the stack partitions is used at the same time by any task. Access to
stack partitions other than the current stack partition is prohibited.
• Two types of code partitions exist:
1. Task private code partitions.
2. Inter task shared code partitions.
Up to six code partitions of each type (task private partitions are counted per task) can exist,
one for the kernel and one for each used software level. Within any execution environment,
access to lower level code partitions is prohibited.
• Four types of data partitions exist:
1. Private data partitions.
2. Inter level shared data partitions.
3. Inter task shared data partitions.
4. Inter level and inter task shared data partitions.
Up to six data partitions of each type (task private partitions are counted per task) can exist,
one for the kernel and one for each used software level.
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This general structure can be seen as a meta-structure of which actual instantiations can be made
by defining the actual instances of the partitions that are needed for an application.
Implementation of a partitioning protection architecture in this way can be done by
implementing a specific instance of the general meta-structure or by implementing support for
the complete general architecture where an instantiation is realised through configuration. The
second option will take more initial effort and will require more system resources but is flexible
and far less effort is needed for reuse.
When actually implementing such a partitioning architecture an analysis should be done on
what the maximum supported software level should be. The software level assigned to the
partitioning management software must be at least the same as the maximum supported
software level of the partitioned components. For maximum flexibility level A should be
assigned to the partition management software. For the rest of this paper it is assumed that the
software level assigned to the partition management software is level A.
2.3 Control coupling
Control coupling is illustrated by Figure 3. Access to other levels of software is completely
controlled by the kernel, which ensures secure control coupling. The kernel assures that on a
change of software level appropriate measures will be taken. The state of the current execution
environment will be saved before the execution environment will be changed and control is
passed to the new software level. Upon return, the execution environment will be restored and
control is passed back to the requesting software level.
Level A Level B Level C Level D Level E 
Kernel 
Interrupts 
Figure 3 control coupling
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The following requirements can be postulated for secure control coupling:
• Control access to a higher level is not permitted in the sense that the kernel does not allow
changing execution environment and passing control to a higher level.
• Control access to a lower level requires an execution environment switch to be done before
actually passing control. Thus, every control access to a lower level must be controlled by
the kernel that will perform the execution environment switch.
• Under no condition may lower level code be executed in a higher-level execution
environment.
• Higher level code may be run within a lower-level execution environment. In this case, no
kernel intervention is needed and can be statically realised through the MMU.
• Change of control to another task is allowed only by specially assigned scheduling code,
which may be either part of the kernel or implemented as user code. In either case, the
scheduling code must be assigned at least the software level of the highest incorporated
level of software in the application.
• Asynchronous control couplings (i.e. interrupt handling) are always handled by the kernel
which however may dispatch actual handling to user level code after an appropriate
environment switch.
Control couplings that require an execution environment change are serviced by the kernel by
supplying so called call gates. Calls to the call gates can be completely controlled by the kernel,
which can prevent any illegal control changes.
2.4 Data coupling
For data coupling between levels and tasks, some frequently used techniques can be used. The
focus is on the basic concept of shared memory usage. More advanced schemes - like message
passing - can be easily incorporated as an extension.
Figure 1 shows four classes of data partitions. Three of these classes are shared data partition
types enabling the usage of three different kinds of sharing:
• Inter level sharing (i.e. no sharing between tasks).
• Inter task sharing (i.e. no sharing between software levels).
• Inter level and inter task sharing.
Inter level sharing is of special interest with respect to safety critical software development.
Access right restrictions must be enforced for inter level sharing which is not explicitly
necessary for inter task sharing.
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The following restrictions must be enforced on shared data between software levels:
• Execution environments with a level lower than the level assigned to the shared data
partition may not have write access to that partition.
• Execution environments with a level higher than the level assigned to the shared data
partition may read from that partition but this type of access has to happen in a controlled
way. Design and verification must show that usage of this data will not degrade the safety
level of the functionality under any condition. To ease design and verification this kind of
access could be made available only through requests to the kernel.
• Other types of access to shared data cannot degrade the safety level; thus, they can be
permitted without restrictions.
2.5 Reusability and extendibility
The immense increase in quantity and complexity of software in airborne systems goes hand in
hand with the increase and complexity of the hardware it runs on. Because of this growth reuse
and extendibility of applied concepts in applications is also becoming increasingly important in
order to save effort and cost. The partitioning architecture as discussed above is very capable of
both being reusable as well as being extendable.
One easy extension is to support communication methods other than communication via shared
memory. For example, a message-passing concept could be incorporated in the kernel.
Messages have the advantage that they are inherently more controlled than shared memory
access. This concept is used for example in a commercial operating system which is currently
undergoing certification for DO-178B level B [OS98].
Current avionics development moves more and more towards the concept of Integrated Modular
Avionics (IMA). The ARINC specification 653 [Aer97] specifies the baseline-operating
environment for application software used within IMA. One aspect addressed by the ARINC
653 [Aer97] specification is partitioning. The developed partitioning architecture can be
extended to an ARINC 653 [Aer97] compliant IMA system.
Another extension would be support for distributed systems. Take for example N processors -
which are compliant with the requirements for this partitioning architecture - with
communication channels to interconnect them. On each of these processors, the developed
partitioning architecture could be used. The architecture could then be extended to incorporate
inter processor sharing and protection.
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3 Instantiation of the partitioning architecture in a realised certified application
A dedicated instantiation of the partitioning architecture as discussed in section 2 was
successfully implemented in a realised and certified application. The choice to implement a
dedicated instantiation of the partitioning architecture instead of a complete configurable
implementation was based on factors concerning development cost and resource usage. The
realised application concerns an avionics device that manages the equipment of a flight display
sub-system - which the device is part of - and all the data flows in the sub-system. This sub-
system is designed to operate in all possible configurations of single/dual pilot (SP/DP) and
visual/instrument flight rules (VFR/IFR). For IFR the management device is duplicated and is
re-configurable by the (co)pilot. In addition, some of the most critical flight data equipment are
duplicated and re-configurable for IFR. All reconfigurations are also managed by the realised
application.
Corruption of some of the parameters handled by the flight control display management
equipment is considered a catastrophic failure condition. Therefore the software components
that handle those parameters are categorised as level A; other components of the software are
categorised at lower levels (i.e. B and E).
3.1 Partitioning protection architecture
Figure 4 shows the dedicated instantiation of the general structure (see Figure 1) as it is
implemented in the realised application. Four instead of six execution environments are
implemented; transitions are the same as in Figure 2.
 
Task state store 
partition 
Level=kernel 
 
Stack partition 
Level=[kern,A,B,E] 
 
Private data 
partition 
Level=[kern,A,B,E] 
 
Code partition 
Level=[kern,A,B,E] 
 
Inter level shared 
data partition 
Level=[kern,A,B,E] 
2 
Task 
6 
4 
4 
4 
Figure 4 dedicated instantiation of the partitioning structure
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3.2 Control Coupling
The implementation of the partitioning architecture in the realised application has an additional
restriction concerning control coupling. This restriction states that only the highest software
level (i.e. level A) is allowed to initiate control change to another level. This restriction prevents
the situation where e.g. a level A component calls a level B component which in turn calls a
level E component. The latter call could be very well unwanted since one of the requirements
states that no level E software shall be executed when the aircraft is in the air. Note however
that enforcing this restriction is not necessary because the application design should not include
these cases (they are in conflict with the requirements) and the verification process should
identify these cases if the software would inadvertently include one.
3.3 Data coupling
The partitioning architecture implemented in the realised application contains only one type of
shared data partition namely: `Inter task & inter level shared data partition'. Access rights on
shared data partitions are more restrictive then those defined for the general partitioning
architecture:
• Write access is allowed only to data partitions with the same level as the level of the current
execution environment.
• Read access is allowed to all data partitions. Access to data partitions of levels lower than
the current execution level have been accounted for in the application design and it has been
verified that invalid data cannot lead to an uncontrolled failure condition.
3.4 Overhead assessment
After the realisation of the partitioning architecture in this application, two assessments have
been done concerning the introduced overhead.
1. Overhead in development effort.
2. Overhead in system resource usage.
The effort that has been put into the development of the partitioning architecture is about 1% of
the total development effort put into the application. This effort is easily compensated for by the
decrease in verification effort especially for modifications of the application.
The two main resources that are used by the partitioning architecture are processor capacity and
memory. The partitioning architecture induces only about 1% performance overhead for the
realised application. Concerning memory consumption it was determined that the usage of
ROM increased by approximately 20KB on 496KB and the usage of RAM increased by about
20KB on 512KB.
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4 Conclusions
This paper presented a partitioning architecture for safety critical airborne systems based on the
usage of a processor with system/user protection and an MMU. With the incorporation of
modern powerful processors in these systems, such a partitioning architecture can be ported to
many different systems. The major benefits of this architecture are:
• Little performance overhead.
• Few memory resource requirements.
• No extra hardware requirements besides the processor protection facilities and MMU.
• Portability to a variety of systems.
• Flexibility to adjust to specific application requirements. It is even easy to adjust an existing
application to incorporate this partitioning architecture.
• Easy extendibility with application specific requirements or with more general functional
extensions. Among the possible extensions to this basic partitioning architecture are:
• Support for more advanced data coupling techniques like message passing.
• Support for Integrated Modular Avionics.
• Support for distributed and multi-processor systems.
The partitioning architecture has been successfully implemented in a realised and certified
avionics application with very reasonable resource usage. It can be concluded that this
partitioning architecture is very useful and can be applied in future applications.
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